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Shift Working and Trade in Labor Services 





Using a two-factor (labor and capital), two-good (shift-working and non shiftworking 
commodities) model with two countries (Home and Foreign) which are located in different 
time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labor services (via communication networks) 
on the comparative advantage of countries capable of such trade. It is shown that a 
comparative advantage in the shift-working commodity is held by pairs of countries in 
different time zones and connected through a good communication network. Concerning 
factor prices, if the shiftworking commodity is capital (resp. labor) intensive, the wage rate 
for day-shift labor will decrease (resp. increase) as a result of trade in labor services. It is also 
demonstrated that this kind of labor services utilization is mutual: some of Home’s day-shift 
labor will be utilized for Foreign night-shift, and vice versa. Thus, periodic trade in labor 
services occurs across countries. 
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International trade in services is an increasingly important feature of the world economy.
Anecdotal evidence abounds on the rapid growth of new types of services transactions made
possible by information and communications technology. Services transactions between par-
ties can be mediated over vast distances by electronic means both instantaneously and at
low cost.
Advances in electronic communication facilitate cross-border services transactions which
t a k ea d v a n t a g eo ft i m ez o n ed i ﬀerences between countries. For example, recent international
management studies report that, by involving specialized microchip design engineers located
at multiple places around the world, microchip design ﬁrms can obtain eﬃciency beneﬁts by
“following the sun.”1 For time-critical projects, a team in a head oﬃce completes a full day
of design on the project, and at the end of the day passes the project to foreign engineers.
D u r i n gt h en i g h t - t i m ea tt h eh e a do ﬃce, engineers located in a country with a diﬀerent
time zone can provide their services (e.g., development of code or testing of subsystem)
via the Internet. Similar to the microchip design case, many other industries (e.g., legal
services, data entry, and other back-oﬃce operations) utilize these kinds of services based on
time zone diﬀerences. This mode of operation provides the ﬁrms with access to high-talent
workers who would otherwise have to work locally in the night shift.2 In other words, “trade
in labor services based on diﬀerent time zones” is made possible by taking advantage of
communications networks.
Our paper investigates some implications of this trade for the pattern of shift working
and for the comparative advantage of countries that are able to conduct such trades. In a
world without trade in labor services, ﬁr m sh a v et ob u yt h en i g h t - s h i f tl a b o rf r o md o m e s t i c
labor market, which usually requires a wage premium to compensate for working during
inconvenient hours. When the importation of day-time labor services at the local night-time
becomes possible, however, this will result in changes of the relative supplies and demands
for shift working labor services, and hence in factor prices. This factor market eﬀect may be
among one of the most important consequences of the trade in labor services based on time
zone diﬀerences.
While existing literature on international trade oﬀers a number of models that highlight
some important implications of time zone diﬀerences, we are not aware of any model that
c a p t u r e st h er o l eo ft i m ez o n ed i ﬀerences in the pattern of shift working. Our study shows
1See, for example, Zaheer (2000) and Gupta and Seshasai (2004).
2See, for example, Cairncross (1997).
2that trade in labor services across time zone can result in a complete elimination of local
night-time labor, with far-reaching implications for rental rate and day-time wage rate.
Betancourt et al. (1984) was perhaps the ﬁr s tt oi n v e s t i g a t et h er o l eo fs h i f tw o r k i n ga n d
capital utilization in an international trade context. However, they did not consider time
zone diﬀerences and therefore international trade in labor services was not present in their
model. The present study, in contrast, permits trade in labor services based on time zone
diﬀerences and examines its inﬂuence on national factor markets.
For these purposes, we construct a simple model of two small open economies (Home and
Foreign) with two production factors (labor and capital). We embed these two economies in
a world economy consisting of many small open economies. Home and Foreign are assumed
to be located on diﬀerent time zones. The model has two goods. The ﬁrst is Good  ,t h e
production of which does not require shift working. The production of the other good, Good
, is subject to shift working. We call the latter the shift-working commodity. Following
Betancourt et al. (1984), we assume that one day (24 hours) is divided into a day-time shift
(6 a.m. to 6 p.m.) and a night-time shift (6 p.m. to 6 a.m.). Firms in the  sector buy
labor from two separate labor markets.
Using the model outlined above, we study the impact of trade in labor services between
Home and Foreign based on time zone diﬀerences. We show that if the importation of such
labor services becomes possible, it results in a decrease in the wage premium for domestic
night-shift workers. Then Home and Foreign, which utilize labor services with time zone
diﬀerences have a comparative advantage in the shift-working commodity, Good ,r e l a t i v e
to other pair of economies for which such trade is not possible (for example, because they
do not have a good communication network). This comparative advantage arises because in
Home and Foreign (or, generally, in pairs of countries in diﬀerent time zones and connected
through a good communication network) the  sector beneﬁts from the reduction in the
wage premium for night-shift workers. It is clear that this kind of labor services utilization
is mutual one: some of Home’s day-shift labor will be utilized for Foreign night-shift, and
vice versa.
Our study is closely related to the literature on the role of time zones in international
trade. In a pioneering paper, Marjit (2007) examined the role of international time zone
diﬀerences in a vertically integrated Ricardian framework under perfect competition.3 He
showed that time-diﬀerence emerges as an independent driving force of international trade
besides taste, technology and endowment. Our model with shift work is complementary to
3See also a recent contribution by Matsuoka and Fukushima (2010).
3this literature in that we shed new light on the impact of trade in labor services with time
zone diﬀerences on national factor markets.4
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present the basic model.
The impact of labor service trade with time zone diﬀerences is considered in section 3,
followed by concluding remarks presented in section 4.
2 The Model
We have two small open economies, Home and Foreign, and the Rest-of-the-World (ROW).
Each country is endowed with labor ()a n dc a p i t a l( ). These countries can produce two
goods, the knowledge intensive Good  and the traditional Good  ,o fw h i c ho n l yt h e
former is subject to shift-work. We call Good  the shift-working commodity. Markets are
competitive and open every 24 hours. The central assumption is that one day (24 hours) is
divided into a day-time shift (6 a.m. to 6 p.m.) and night-time shift (6 p.m. to 6 a.m.), the
length of each shift being 12 hours.5
Home and Foreign are located in diﬀerent time zones and there is no overlap in daytime
working hours: when Home’s daytime working hours end, Foreign’s daytime working hours
begin (Figure 1). Except for time zone diﬀerences, these two countries are identical in terms
of technology and factor endowments. We assume that the price of  and  ,  and 
are determined in the ROW and are beyond control of the countries we deal with. Let the
outputs generated per day be denoted by  and  .I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ec o n c e n t r a t eo nw h a t
happens in Home.
From the viewpoint of the ﬁrm, there are two pools of labor,  and ,w h e r e
denotes the total supply of day-shift labor and  denotes the total supply of night-shift
labor. The  sector uses both day and night-shift labor while the  sector uses the former
only. There is another factor of production, capital, which is used by both sectors and whose
supply (in stock terms) is denoted by .
4The present study is also related to the literature of the fragmentation of production stages and of
service provision, which has been studied within a trade-theoretic framework by Jones and Kierzkowski
(1990), Harris (1998), Jones and Marjit (2001), Deardorﬀ (2001), Long et al. (2005) and Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Another important related literature is the role of international factor mobility in
the world economy. See, for example, Wong (1995).
5This assumption is taken from Betancourt et al. (1984).
42.1 Utility Function and the Supply of Labor
We shall assume that each worker has  units of time and supplies inelastically a ﬁxed amount
 of labor. Let
 ≡ ( − ) (1)
denote the (ﬁxed) amount of leisure. The worker must decide whether he oﬀers the ﬁxed
amount  in day shift, or in night shift.6 In what follows, we normalize  as 1. Workers are not
identical in their degree of dislike for nigh-time work. We assume that there is a continuum
of workers, indexed by Ψ,w h e r eΨ ∈ [0 ¯ Ψ]. Assume that they are uniformly distributed.
For any level of consumption  (where  is the number of units of “consumption basket”
he consumes), a worker of type Ψ obtains the utility  =  if he works in a day shift, and
the utility  = (1 + Ψ) if he works in a night shift. The wage rate for day labor is 
and that for night labor is   .
Assume that workers consume all their income (which consists only of wage income).
Then a night shift (respectively, day shift) worker will have consumption level  = 
(respectively,  = )w h e r e is the price of the consumption basket. It follows
t h a t ,g i v e nt h ew a g ep r o ﬁle ( ), there is a “pivot worker” who is indiﬀerent between
being a night shift worker and a day shift worker (his utility level being the same for both















Workers whose Ψ is lower than ˜ Ψ will choose to be night shift workers, and enjoy a utility
level greater than e .W o r k e r sw h o s eΨ is greater than ˜ Ψ will choose to be day shift workers,
and enjoy the same utility level e  as the pivot worker.
Equation (2) deﬁnes the supply of night-shift labor: if the night-shift labor force is to
increase, increasingly unwilling workers have to be drawn into night work and the required
wage premium increases. Since the parameter Ψ is distributed uniformly over the interval
[0 ¯ Ψ], the night-shift labor supply curve will be shown as a curve  in Figure 2,w h e r et h e
vertical axis represents  while the horizontal axis represents the level of night-shift
labor.7
6He cannot work partly in night shift and partly in day shift.
7The assumption of a uniform distribution implies that  is linear. This assumption can be easily
52.2 Technology
Following Betancourt et al. (1984, 1985), we assume if a ﬁrm  rents  units of capital, it
must pay capital owners  dollars per day, regardless of whether  is used only for the
d a ys h i f t( a n dt h u sl i e si d l ea tn i g h t )o ri su s e df o rb o t hs h i f t s .T h u st h e r ei sa ni n c e n t i v ef o r
a ﬁrm in sector  t oo p e r a t et w os h i f t s( ad a yt i m es h i f ta n dan i g h tt i m es h i f t )p r o v i d e d
that the wage  is not prohibitively expensive.8







where  is the daily rate of output, 
 ( =  ) is the distinct labor input used in -shift,
and  is the common capital used in both shifts, and where  is assumed to be linear
homogeneous, increasing, and strictly quasi-concave in its arguments.
We also assume that ﬁrms face a zero ex-post elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor services.9 This assumption implies that ﬁrms have to maintain the same capital-
services-to-labor-services ratio during the day and night shifts. Thus while this ratio can
be altered in the long run in response to a change in factor prices, it cannot be altered in
the short run, and thus certainly not within the same day. In other words, we require that
the same number of workers be working at each machine, whether it is in day time or night






In what follows, we assume that sector  ﬁrms ﬁnd it eﬃcient to operate both shifts.10




relaxed without any change in the qualitative results.
8Firms in sector  cannot operate two shifts.
9This is a standard assumption in the capital utilization literature. See, for example, Betancourt and
Clague (1981, ch. 2).
10We in fact are assuming that  is not too expensive, so that it is economical for the  sector ﬁrms to











where () is the unit cost function associated with the production function (). This condition implies
that the average unit cost when working two shifts (LHS) is less than that when working only day shift
(RHS). This assumption will be maintained throughout the paper.
6Production of  is assumed to be operating during the day-shift only. Therefore we can
represent its output by a conventional neoclassical production function
 = ( ) (6)
where  is linear homogeneous in its arguments, and  and , respectively, are capital
and labor employed in the  sector.
Capital market clearing requires that
 +  =  (7)
2.3 Equilibrium under Communications Autarky
Now, let us consider the equilibrium conditions under communications autarky (i.e. Foreign
and Home cannot engage in international trade in labor services because of lack of commu-
nications networks).11 Denoting the rental on capital by , cost minimization by ﬁrms in the









Optimality requires that the value of marginal product of labor in each shift be equated to
the average wage in the  sector, ¯ ,w h i c hi sd e ﬁned as ( + )2.





As it has been mentioned, by normalization, we can suppose that each worker supplies






 +  =  (12)
We now proceed to determine the equilibrium values under communications autarky. We
must show how, given the world relative price  and given Home’s endowment (),
the equilibrium values of (  
 
 ) are determined. (Note that 
 = 
). In
what follows, we use a diagrammatic approach.
11Note that, even under communications autarky, Good  and Good  are traded internationally.
7The model can be solved by utilizing a demand curve and a supply curve for night-shift
labor 
. As mentioned above, the supply curve is given in equation (2) and is represented
by the curve  in Figure 2.
Next, let us derive the demand curve for night-shift labor. If we ﬁxt h el e v e lo f
,i t
also implies that we ﬁx 
 and  [see, (4) and (12)]. Thus, for given levels of 
, 
,
and ,a n do f and , one can draw the value of marginal product of capital ( )
curves [see, (8) and (10)]. These curves are drawn in the left panel of Figure 3,w h e r ew e
measure capital stocks on the horizontal axis and  on the vertical line farthest to the left.
The total capital stock is indicated by the distance from the origin to the point ¯ ,a n d
 is measured to the right from ¯  and  is measured to the left from the origin. The
intersection of the two   curves determines the levels of  and  and the value of
.
Now we can draw the value of marginal product of labor ( ) curves in the right
panel of Figure 3, where the total availability of labor is indicated by the distance along the
horizontal axis from the origin to the point ¯ . 
 is measured to the right from the origin
and  is measured to the left from point ¯ . The horizontal distance between 
 and 
is 
,w h i c he q u a l s
 (see (4)). On the vertical axis from the origin we measure ¯  and
on the vertical line from point ¯  we measure .T h e  curves for 
 and for ,
together with the values of 





We have now found the values of  and , and hence (), for a given value of

. We repeat this process for each value of 
 and trace out the demand curve for 
,
denoted  in Figure 2. Communications autarky equilibrium is obtained as an intersection
of the curve  and the curve ,p o i n t.
3E ﬀects of Advances in Communications on Shiftwork
and Trade in Labor Services
Now let us consider the impact of technological advances in communications networks. In
our scenario, via communications networks, day-shift worker in one country can provide its
labor services as the other country’s night-shift labor services but is paid domestic daytime
wage. In other words, the night-shift labor in one country is replaced by the day-shift labor
8in the other country.12 This tends to reduce the cost to produce Good :n o wﬁrms in each
country can import daytime labor services during local nighttime. For ease of exposition we
will concentrate on the case where labor services can be imported without additional trade
costs.13
The impact of technological advancement is represented in Figure 2, which compares
Home communications autarky equilibrium, point , and the one with the importation of
Foreign daytime labor. The impact can be interpreted as if the disutility from night-shift
labor supply vanishes, which would produce a ﬂatter 0 curve and the graph shows that

 (which now indicates imported Foreign daytime labor) would increase and  would
fall: the new equilibrium with the importation of Foreign daytime labor is depicted as point
 in Figure 2.
In this case, the night-shift workers in one country are completely replaced by the day-
shift workers in the other country, and the night-shift wage premium vanishes. It is important
to note that, due to symmetric setting between countries, half of workers in the  sector work
as the Home day-shift worker during Home daytime, while the other half work as Foreign
n i g h t - s h i f tw o r k e ra n dr e c e i v i n gt h es a m ew a g er a t e( ˜  in Figure 3). Since the wage
premium vanishes, both 
 and 
 would rise. This change would shift up the  
curve so that  would rise. Hence the supply of Good  would rise. Analogously, 
and  must fall, and thus the supply of Good  must fall. Thus, comparing a pair
of communications autarky countries with time zone diﬀerences and a pair of connected
countries with time zone diﬀerences, other things being equal, the latter pair would have
a comparative advantage in the shift-working commodity . This is because, in these
countries, the  sector works eﬃciently through the reduction in extra labor costs for night-
shift workers.
Proposition 1 (Comparative Advantage): Other things being equal, a pair of connected
(i.e., labor trading) countries with time zone diﬀerences would have a comparative advantage
in the shift-working commodity relative to a pair of communications autarky countries with
t i m ez o n ed i ﬀerences.
What happens to factor prices? The answer depends on factor intensities. If  
,t h e na st h e sector releases labor and capital at given factor prices, the  sector
12It is important to note that this condition comes from one more basic assumption: when exporting its
labor services, workers in one country does not utilize its domestic capital. Although this assumption is
rather strong, to keep matters simple, we posit this condition.
13The case of importing labor services with additional trade costs will be discussed in the end of this
section.
9tries to absorb the factors at a higher ratio of capital to labor than they are being released,
and consequently there is upward pressure on  and downward pressure on .
A graphical representation of this case is shown in Figure 3. 
 rises to ˜ 
.  
shifts up and   shifts down in such a way that their intersection occurs at a higher
level of .   shifts down and   shifts up in a such a way that at the new levels
of  and 
,  goes down.14
Proposition 2 (Factor Prices): Suppose that    holds. Then a techno-
logical advance in communications networks that enables trade in labor services across time
zones would result in a decrease in wages to day-shift labor, and an increase in rental for
both countries.
Let us consider this proposition more precisely. Utilization of communications networks and
time zone diﬀerences imply that the avoidance of the domestic night-shift labor. Thus, given
factor prices, ﬁrms in the  sector have an incentive to expand its production. Then, via
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism, relative factor price changes due to factor intensity
rankings.15 The point is that, without information on factor intensity rankings, one cannot
predict the impact of trade in labor services with time zone diﬀerences on national factor
markets.
Next let us move to trade patterns of labor services. As it has been mentioned, during
Home’s daytime, half of the day-shift labor in the  sector is exported to Foreign as the
night-shift labor services. During Home’s nighttime, the patterns will be reversed: Firms in
the  sector imports Foreign day-shift labor. Thus, due to communications breakthroughs,
two-way trade in labor services with time zone diﬀerences occurs across countries. These
patterns are summarized in Figure 4.
Interestingly, these kinds of trade in labor services with time zone diﬀerences can be
interpreted as a (new) form of periodic intra-industry trade. Traditionally, trade in per-
ishable agricultural products, electricity and similar goods has been based on predictable,
periodic ﬂuctuations in countries’ production of, or demand for, these commodities. As for
agricultural products, for example, the cycle is seasonal, based on the diﬀerences in climatic
zones. The present study emphasizes that, due to communications revolutions, similar kinds
14Recall that under international trade in labor services between Home and Foreign, Home would pay 
for the local (Home) night shift operated by Foreign workers who are working in Foreign day time.
15It is clear that, if Good  is labor intensive, the above argument is reversed and there is downward
pressure on  and upward pressure on .
10of trade in labor services based on the diﬀerences in time zones emerge.
Proposition 3 (Periodic Trade in Labor Services): Due to a technological advance
in communications networks, periodic trade in labor services occurs. Each country becomes
an exporter of labor services during its local daytime, while it becomes an importer of labor
services during its local nighttime.
It is important to note that this periodic trade in labor services, which makes the  sector
more eﬃcient, boosts trade in ﬁnal goods. In that sense, trade in labor services (i.e., a version
of factor movements) and trade in ﬁnal goods are complements in the present setting.
Before closing this section, let us brieﬂy consider the case of labor importation with
additional trade costs. In this case, the domestic night-shift labor is not completely wiped
out: some domestic night-shift labor and some imported day-shift labor coexists and the
wage premium for the night-shift remains.16 Still, an importation of daytime labor services
implies that there are downward pressure on , which works to expands to the supply of
Good . Thus, our propositions still hold under the cases of additional (but not prohibited)
costs with labor importation.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this study we highlight the impact of trade in labor services with time zone diﬀerences
on the nature of shift working, on the pattern of comparative advantage, and on factor
prices. It is shown that a comparative advantage in the shift-working commodity is held by
the connected (i.e., labor trading) countries. Concerning factor prices, given that the shift-
working commodity is capital (resp. labor) intensive, the wage rate for day-shift labor will
be decreased (resp. increased) due to technological advancement. It is also demonstrated
that this kind of labor services utilization is mutual: some of Home’s day-shift labor will be
utilized for Foreign night-shift, and vice versa. Thus, periodic trade in labor services occurs
across countries. Although these results are derived under the assumption that there are
no additional trade costs on labor, it seems to provide a new perspective on the oﬀshore
outsourcing and wage debate.17 Inclusion of both shift-working and time zone diﬀerences
aspects shed new light on the impact of oﬀshoring services.
16One way to include this aspect is to assume the iceberg trading costs. In that case, Home wage rate for
night-shift work will be equalized to Foreign day-shift wage rate with trading costs in equilibrium.
17See Marjit and Acharyya (2003) for discussion.
11T h e s er e s u l t sh a v es o m ei m p o r t a n c ef o re c o n o m i cp o l i c y .I fo n ec o u n t r yc o u l dp r o v i d ei t s
daytime labor as the night-shift work for the other country via communications networks,
then one of the ﬁrst eﬀects of such trade in labor services will be a drastic change in factor
prices. Further research should focus on these policy implications. The model could be
enriched with the inclusion of additional trade costs of labor importation.
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Periodic trade in labor services
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